More confusion on the correct causation test in whistleblowing cases as the Court of Appeal controversially overturns the EAT decision in NHS Manchester v Fecitt. The Court of Appeal has held that section 47B of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (protection from detriment on the ground of a protected disclosure) is infringed if a protected disclosure materially (i.e. more than trivially) influences an employer’s treatment of an employee who has made a whistle-blowing allegation. It also held that an employer cannot be made vicariously liable under the whistle-blowing legislation for such actions of its employees as one might otherwise argue amount to victimisation. This is because an employer can only be held vicariously liable for the legal wrongs of its employees (see the House of Lords decision in Majrowski v Guys and St Thomas’ NHS Trust). In contrast to discrimination legislation, there is no clear statutory provision which makes it illegal to victimise employees who make protected disclosures.

Revisiting briefly the facts of this case, it concerned three nurses who worked for NHS Manchester and who, in various capacities, raised concerns about the qualifications of a colleague. An investigation disclosed no major concerns but the three nurses did not let the matter drop and caused general dissent among the staff working with them. As a result of what then became a ‘dysfunctional’ working atmosphere, one claimant had her managerial responsibilities removed, one was redeployed and the other, a bank nurse, was given no further work. They brought claims that they had been subjected to a detriment under s.47B Employment Rights Act. NHS Manchester’s response was that the reason for its actions was that it was the ‘only feasible method’ to deal with the dysfunctional working conditions created by the three nurses. Continue reading →