a well-meaning homespun impression of human rights

Hill v Governing Body Of Great Tey Primary School is another high profile case which I mentioned briefly last month. Since it concerns disclosure of information and that is such a hot topic at the moment the decision is, I believe, worth further analysis, particularly in terms of the possible application of the European Convention on Human Rights The case concerned a dinner lady who was dismissed for breach of confidentiality after telling parents about a nasty bit of playground behaviour involving their child (the innocent party) without permission, and then going to the local press about it when she was suspended. The child had been tied to a railing in the playground and whipped across the legs by other pupils. There were red marks on her legs and rope burns and scratches on her wrists.
When she was sacked she made an unsuccessful whistle-blowing claim, and a successful unfair dismissal claim.
An Employment Tribunal found that she had been dismissed unfairly because the investigation and disciplinary process before dismissal were unfair, but that she would have been dismissed within a couple of months had a fair procedure been followed – and she was also guilty of 80% contributory fault, reducing her compensation accordingly. The Tribunal concluded that she would have been dismissed fairly after two months if proper procedure had been followed, and taking into account in addition the 80% deduction on account of her contributory conduct, awarded her £49.99
The Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) overturned the decision and remitted it for a rehearing.

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it’s not apportionment – but it certainly looks like it

If anyone wonders just how expensive and protracted an employment dispute can be the Court of Appeal decision in London Borough of Hackney v Sivanandan is well worth reading. Lord Justice Mummery introduces his judgment as follows:
"It is 12 years since this discrimination dispute began. It arose out of two unsuccessful job applications at the end of the 20th century. The case is now a 21st century version of a 19th century Chancery saga. And it is not over yet.
"The reader of this judgment will be spared what Underhill J (the President) described in the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) as the “complex and extraordinarily long history”. It is a Dickensian narrative of allegations and counter-allegations, applications and cross-applications, misunderstandings, objections, complaints, hearings, adjournments, reviews, appeals and cross-appeals and repeated wrangling about procedure, case management matters, schedules, and even about the bundling and delivery of documents."
However, it is not the extraordinary length and complexity of the proceedings which justifies this item. Rather, the Court addressed the question of whether a tribunal is entitled, where there is more than one discriminator, to apportion liability between respondents.
Ms Natasha Sivanadan failed to get a post as a Training and Development Co-ordinator for Hackney Action for Racial Equality (“HARE”). Subsequently she brought discrimination proceedings against Ms White, an employee of Hackney Council (“Hackney”) who was on the interview panel for the job, a number of others involved in the recruitment process, and Hackney itself, on the basis that Hackney was vicariously liable for its employees’ actions. At two separate hearings, an Employment Tribunal awarded compensation of £1,905.41 against Ms White, and £421,415 against Hackney, the latter including aggravated damages of £25,000.
Hackney appealed two aspects of the award of compensation. First it challenged the element of aggravated damages (but not the calculation of the rest of the compensation) and, second, it argued that the Tribunal could not award any more compensation against it than the £1,905.41 it had awarded against Ms White.

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Poundland and (not) human rights

It was difficult to miss the near ubiquitous reporting of the Court of Appeal’s decision in the case of Reilly & Anor, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, in which it quashed the Jobseeker’s Allowance (Employment and Enterprise) Regulations 2011 SI 2011/917. Contrary to the impression given by (some of) the media, the Court did not find that there was any breach of the human rights of unemployed people who had been compelled to undertake unpaid “work experience” to avoid having their jobseeker’s allowance withdrawn. Rather, there had been a failure to introduce these workfare programmes within the scope of any primary legislation. In particular, the “job seekers” had been misled about how long they could lose benefits for if they did not agree to participate.
In fact the Court of Appeal specifically made it clear that there was nothing wrong, in principle, with having such schemes. Lord Justice Pill summarised the position as follows:
A policy of imposing requirements on persons receiving a substantial weekly sum, potentially payable for life, is readily understandable. Equally, the means sought to achieve that end are understandable; claimants should be required to participate in arrangements which may improve their prospects of obtaining remunerative employment. Provided schemes “are designed to assist [claimants] to obtain employment” and to “[improve] their prospects of obtaining employment”…sanctions for failing to participate are understandable. Whether a particular arrangement meets those statutory requirements…is susceptible to challenge by judicial review, but that stage has not been reached. The issue is whether the Scheme named in the Regulations satisfies the requirements for specificity in section 17A by way of being “prescribed”.

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whistleblowing update

Whistleblowing has been well and truly in the news this month and on 26 February the government announced a strengthening of the protection provided to those who make disclosures. The Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill is to be amended to include protection for employees who suffer bullying or harassment from co-workers. At present the only protection available is in respect of action taken by the employer.
The protection will make employers vicariously liable for the acts of co-workers, in much the same way as the protection which already exists in the event of discrimination. The employer will therefore be held liable for the actions of co-workers unless it is able to show that it took all reasonable steps to prevent the detrimental treatment of the whistleblower by the co-worker or workers.
Employment Relations Minister Jo Swinson (who, as a result of recent news concerning Lord Rennard no doubt has this very much in mind at the moment!) said:
The protection offered by whistleblowing legislation is strong but there are always ways to improve it. This amendment takes into account recent events and will place whistleblowers, who are making a difficult decision, in a better position. They will now have a specific employment protection in place and be able to have the full force of a tribunal behind them if they suffer any detriment, bullying or harassment from a co-worker.
The change will not impact on good employers who see that it as their responsibility to make sure their staff have a good working environment.
Examples of whistleblowing issues in the news this month include:
– A health services manager who says that he was gagged by the NHS and prevented from speaking out about patient safety concerns (BBC News; Mail Online)
– A gas market whistleblower who was sacked after accusing utility companies of price fixing (Guardian Online)
– A BBC whistleblower who says that he was threatened with prison for contacting the media (Guardian Online)
– A Lord Rennard accuser dismissed with gagging clause after telling her employer she was pregnant (Daily Telegraph)

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legal advice privilege only covers advice from legally qualified advisers

Another new Supreme Court decision (Prudential plc & Anor, R (on the application of) v Special Commissioner of Income Tax & Anor) looks at the extent of legal advice privilege, and in particular whether parties to disputes can be ordered to disclose legal advice from advisers such as accountants.
The advice in question in this case related to a tax avoidance scheme devised by PricewaterhouseCoopers which was taken up by the Prudential group of companies. HMRC sought disclosure of documents relating to the scheme from Prudential, who refused, claiming that the documents were covered by legal advice privilege, and so did not have to be disclosed. The point was considered by a Special Tax Commissioner, who ordered disclosure, and then by the Administrative Court and the Court of Appeal, both of which considered that the documents were not privileged. Prudential then took the case to the Supreme Court, who, by a majority, agreed. While there was some logic in the argument that legal advice given by non lawyers should be protected in the same way as legal advice given by legally qualified advisers, the limitation was an historical one they were not prepared to depart from:
If we were to allow this appeal, we would therefore be extending [legal advice privilege] beyond what are currently, and have for a long time been understood to be, its limits. Indeed, we would be extending it considerably, as the issue cannot simply be treated as limited to the question whether tax advice given by expert accountants is covered by [legal advice privilege]. While that is the specific question between the parties, it is just a subset, no doubt an important subset, of a much larger set. To concentrate on tax advice given by accountants would be wrong, because it would ineluctably follow from our accepting Prudential’s argument that legal advice given by some other professional people would also be covered
This decision is a particularly significant one for employment law, where there are many providers of employment law advice who are not legally qualified.

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disciplinary sanctions – a caveat

Demotion and/or redeployment are relatively rare as potential outcomes of disciplinary procedures, not least because it would be a risky strategy to impose them without an express contractual power. Piper v Maidstone & Tunbridge NHS Trust demonstrates a pitfall for employers who do include these penalties in their disciplinary procedures.
Reverend Piper was Head Chaplain of Maidstone & Tunbridge Wells NHS Trust, until he was dismissed for gross misconduct following an incident involving his manager (no more details are given by the Employment Appeal Tribunal in their judgment as to what this incident involved). He appealed internally against his dismissal, successfully to the extent that the employer sought to substitute a final written warning plus demotion by a grade and a transfer, relying on a provision in the disciplinary procedure (which was also a part of his contact of employment) which allowed for these sanctions:
Action Short of Dismissal
There may occasionally be exceptional circumstances where management take the view that whilst dismissal may be warranted, organisational and employee circumstance may best be served by action short of dismissal itself. In these circumstances, one of the following sanctions may be considered as an alternative to dismissal only. These sanctions will normally be applied on a substantive basis. If the employee does not agree with this course of action, dismissal is the only alternative [my emphasis].
– Demotion without pay protection
– Disciplinary transfer to another post within the organisation – without pay protection or excess mileage payments
The Trust cannot create posts to accommodate demotions or transfers and consideration of such a course of action will only be possible where a vacancy exists. Any of the above sanctions will be accompanied by a final written warning.
The reverend gentleman did not agree to that course of action.

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the chance a dismissal might have been fair is no bar to reinstatement

Reinstatement and re-engagement are remedies a tribunal must consider whenever a claimant indicates a desire for either of them. Arriva London Ltd v Eleftheriou deals with the matter of when a tribunal finds that a dismissal is unfair, but on the facts there is a chance that the claimant would have been dismissed fairly had a fair procedure been followed. Can a tribunal order reinstatement in such a situation?
Mr Eleftheriou was dismissed from his job as a bus driver in May 2010 while he was waiting for surgery following an injury that prevented him from driving. He had been off sick since January that year. His employer, Arriva, did not seek any medical opinion as to when he would be fit for work before deciding on dismissal. His unfair dismissal case was heard in February 2012, by which time he was fully recovered and was working as a driver for a different company, at a significantly lower salary. The dismissal was found to be unfair, because of the employer’s failure to consider medical evidence before making a decision.
He asked for reinstatement, which the Tribunal granted. It then went on to work out the loss suffered by Mr Eleftheriou between dismissal and the reinstatement order. Then it deducted 60% from that amount, on the basis that there was a 60% chance he could have been fairly dismissed if Arriva had sought medical evidence at the point when they were considering dismissal
Arriva argued that these two orders were inconsistent – it was unfair to order reinstatement where there was a 60% chance there could have been a fair dismissal. The Employment Appeal Tribunal rejected this suggestion. A tribunal is obliged to consider reinstatement and re-engagement before going on to look at compensation. While certain factors which could lead to a deduction in compensation, such as misconduct by the employee, are relevant to the question of reinstatement, the employer’s own procedural failings were not of this nature, and the Tribunal was correct to look at reinstatement without taking them into account. Moreover the fact that Mr Eleftheriou had found a job was no bar to the Tribunal’s power to order reinstatement.
The EAT also held that the Tribunal had misread the provisions regarding compensation for loss between dismissal and reinstatement, and no percentage deduction should have been made. The employee was therefore entitled to full loss of earnings for his period of unemployment, and then the difference between his old and new salary up to the date of reinstatement.

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insufficient investigation made dismissal unfair

Employers should take care to investigate allegations of dishonesty involving breach of trust particularly carefully, suggests the Employment Appeal Tribunal in Stuart v London City Airport.
Mr Stuart was one of 430 ground services employees at London City Airport who was dismissed for gross misconduct. It was alleged that he had gone to a duty free shop in the airport and taken goods without paying for them. His version of events was that a friend had beckoned him over for a chat while he was in the queue to pay for items, and he had not been aware of crossing the threshold of the shop, whereas one witness suggested that he had in fact tried to conceal the goods in his jacket. That witness was not present at any disciplinary hearing or appeal hearing, so her evidence could not be challenged, and the employer did not obtain evidence from other sources suggested by the other employee such as available CCTV, or likely witnesses including the friend or shop assistant manning the till, which could have confirmed or disproved the truth of the allegation of an attempt to hide items.
Since the conduct and scope of disciplinary proceedings is a common concern for many employers, it is worth spending a little time in considering the views of the EAT about what did happen and, more significantly, what should have happened. The facts are outlined in the decision as follows:
On the evening of 21 December 2009 the the Claimant entered Nuance, the duty free shop, to buy some Christmas presents. He chose some items which he stated that he held at all times in his hands; he accepted that he did not use a basket. He first went to pay for them at an un-manned till point, where he queued with another customer before a member of staff told him to go and pay at another till point because that one was closed. He moved over to a different till and began to queue again. During the whole of this period he stated that the items he had chosen were clearly visible in his hands.
What then happened was that he was beckoned over to a seating area immediately outside the shop by another Nuance staff member called Lynette, where she had a conversation with him about the snowy conditions at the airport that day. The Claimant then realised that he was due back from his break shortly and he moved to a refrigerated counter nearby to buy a drink. He still held in his hands the items for which he intended to pay. However, while he was selecting a drink, a police officer came to speak to him, on the basis that he was suspected of dishonestly removing goods from Nuance without paying for them.
The Respondents were informed and the Claimant was suspended on full pay, with effect from 21 December, pending an investigation into alleged gross misconduct involving breach of trust.
The matter was then investigated by the Respondents, as his employers. Statements were taken from Mr Gilani, the Nuance store manager, and from a Nuance staff member, Ms Adenike Adenekan. Strangely, in view of the significance of her evidence, which was very much in dispute, Ms Adenekan did not give evidence, either at the disciplinary hearing or before the Tribunal. Mr Gilani did, on both occasions, and the Tribunal also had his statement which had been made at the time. Mr Gilani’s evidence was that Ms Adenekan had reported concerns that an airport employee inside the shop, later accepted to be the Claimant, was secreting items from the purchasing section under his jacket. The Claimant vigorously denied that. As a result of Ms Adenekan’s report Mr Gilani went on to the shop floor, where he stayed for between 10 and 15 minutes. During that time he saw that there were no other customers in the shop and no queues. He stated that baskets were available for customers but that the Claimant was not carrying a basket.

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beware incapacity dismissals and judging what are day to day activities

Aderemi v London and South Eastern Railway Ltd gives some useful pointers about what sort of disability will be a protected characteristic under the Equality Act 2010.

– While an inability to carry out all your work duties does not equate to an inability to carry out day to day activities, it should not be assumed from this that a work activity is not a day to day activity;
– Tribunals should concentrate on what the employee cannot do, not what he can do, when looking at whether there is a substantial impact on day to day activities;
– When looking at what is substantial or not, it is wrong to think that there is a sliding scale with ”trivial” at one end and “substantial“ at the other – if an effect is not trivial, it is substantial

In this particular case, Mr Aderemi was a station assistant who developed a bad back and was unable to stand for long periods, bend, or lift. This gave him problems carrying out his main duties including checking tickets. His employer dismissed him on the ground of lack of capability. An employment tribunal found that he was not disabled, so his dismissal was not unlawful discrimination, nor was it unfair. In the Employment Appeal Tribunal Mr Justice Langstaff (President) took the view that the tribunal had been unduly restrictive in its approach to what amounted to a day to day activity. As he pointed out:
If the problem is put simply, as being on one’s feet in a job for lengthy periods of time, then it is not difficult to think of very many jobs which would fit that description.
In other words, the ability to stand for longer than half an hour at a time is so commonplace a part of people’s working lives that is falls within the scope of “day to day activity”.
The EAT ordered that both the discrimination finding and the finding that the dismissal was fair were to be reconsidered, pointing out that the decision as to disability could have a knock on effect on the fairness of the dismissal, especially if the disability was caused by the employee’s work.
The case highlights the potentially awkward overlap between potentially fair dismissal on the ground of incapacity and disability discrimination. The letter notifying dismissal included a typical explanation of the reason from an incapacity perspective:

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employment law reform steps up a gear

The government is firming up on some of the many proposals to change employment law mooted in recent months, so we have a rash of consultation papers to digest and implementation dates to look forward to. (What happened to only introducing changes in April and October, to give employers a bit of a chance to keep up, by the way?) It seems that fees for bringing tribunal cases will come into force in July. Fees will be charged both to start a claim and before a hearing can be listed, and will range between £160 to start a simple low value claim, (for example about unlawful deductions) and £950 for a hearing in a more complex claim.
As well as there being an overall cap on unfair dismissal awards (increased to £74,200 from 1 February) there will be a secondary cap at 12 months’ pay – again to come into force this summer (Ending the employment relationship: government response to consultation). This will not stop any “fat cats” (remember them?) enforcing their contracts in the ordinary courts, but will affect those on low earnings with poor job prospects – perhaps because they lack qualifications or are nearing retirement age – always assuming they have been able to fund bringing a tribunal claim.
The plan to introduce a new “employee-owner” status ploughs inexorably on, despite a marked lack of enthusiasm from business. The Law Society has also weighed in with criticism, pointing out that such arrangements "will only add to red tape for small businesses and create confusion about worker’s rights". In a letter to the House of Lords Law Society president Lucy Scott-Moncrief said:
There is potential for costly satellite litigation on a range of complex issues which are likely to arise at the outset and upon termination of an employee’s contract.
For example, if an employer buys back forfeit shares when an employee leaves, satellite litigation could ensue on the question of market value. This runs counter to the government’s stated aim of supporting samll and medium-sized enterprises through simpler regulation.
She also pointed out that restrictions on an employee shareholder’s access to maternity rights and flexible working are "entirely incongruent" with the government’s stated commitement to family friendly policies.
Consultation has started on implementation of a compulsory early conciliation scheme (Early conciliation: a consultation on proposals for implementation), whereby claimants will have to refer themselves to ACAS for early conciliation and will not be able to lodge a claim unless they have done so.

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