Can there still be a TUPE transfer after a gap of five months?

The European Court (CJEU) decision in Jorge Siguenza v Ayuntamiento de Valladolid concerns the potential application of a transfer of undertaking (TUPE transfer in the UK) in a case in which there is a long gap between one undertaking ceasing its activities and another commencing. Mr Siguenza was employed as a music teacher at the Municipal Music School of Valladolid in Spain from November 1996. From 1997 to 2013 management of the school was provided by a contractor, Musicos y Escuela, on behalf of the local authority. In 2012-13, owing to a reduction in the number of pupils, the authority refused to pay the sums claimed under the contract by Musicos y Escuela, which therefore sought the termination of the contract and claimed damages. In response, in August 2013, the authority terminated the contract, alleging wrongful conduct by Musicos y Escuela because it had ceased its activities before the end of the contractual end date. In a series of judgments delivered in 2014 and 2015 the Tribunal Superior determined that the authority had breached the contract because it was committed to providing guaranteed payments irrespective of the number of students, so that failure to make those payments in full had caused the breach of contract.

In the meantime, in March 2013, Musicos y Escuela started consultations with a view to the dismissal of all its staff. Mr Siguenza and his fellow employees were dismissed on 4 April and the company was declared insolvent on 30 July.

In August 2013 the authority assigned the management of the school to In-pulso Musical and provided it with the use of the premises, instruments and equipment necessary for it to carry out its duties. In-pulso Musical commenced its management of the school in September 2013 for the 2013-14 school year and was awarded further contracts for 2014-15 and 2015-16.

Unfair dismissal claims by the former employees failed but Mr Siguenza brought a further claim before the social court. His claim was dismissed on the basis of res judicata (the matter had already been determined by the other court) and he appealed to the high court. In doing so, he contended that there had been a transfer of undertaking from Musicos y Escuela to In-pulso Musical so that his contract of employment should have been preserved. It was this aspect of his claim that was transferred to the CJEU.

Is it fair to dismiss for action which falls short of gross misconduct?

It is well known that dismissal can result from a single matter which is usually found to amount to gross misconduct, or as the result of more than one event, with the prior matters resulting in written warnings and/or a final written warning. Indeed, most disciplinary procedures outline this process and generally include examples of what will normally be treated as gross misconduct.

However, in Quintiles Commercial UK v Barongo the question for the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) was whether it was fair for Quintiles to dismiss Mr Barongo for conduct which was initially classified as gross misconduct but subsequently downgraded to serious misconduct.

Quintiles supplies staff for pharmaceutical companies. Mr Barongo started working for them in October 2012 and was latterly engaged to sell drugs for Astra Zeneca. On 5 January 2016 he was dismissed on notice on two grounds. First, he had failed complete Astra Zeneca’s compliance training course by the deadline of 3 November 2015 and, second, failing to attend their compulsory training course on 19 November 2015. Mr Barongo did not deny the allegations and he also accepted that they amounted to misconduct on his part. However, he contended that he had been dealing with other matters. He said that he had not intentionally failed to engage with the training but he had chosen to priorities other matters. This had been at a time when he was on a performance improvement plan.

There was a disciplinary hearing conducted with his line manager which took place by telephone. As the EAT pointed out, conducting the hearing by phone might not have been best practice but it was not in itself unfair. His line manager concluded that the duty of trust and confidence which ought to exist between employer and employee had been broken and, as a result, Mr Barongo was dismissed on notice, for gross misconduct.

He appealed against the decision and the appeal was heard by one of the employer’s directors, Mr Athey, who took the view that there had been a breach of the duty of trust and confidence, but that it amounted to serious rather than gross misconduct.

Mr Barongo submitted a claim of unfair dismissal to the Employment Tribunal. The Tribunal took the view that the downgrading of the misconduct from gross to serious was highly significant:

How to deal with convictions for sexual offences committed by a person associated with the employee

Judgments of the Supreme Court concerning employment law issues are fairly infrequent and usually worthy of attention. That is certainly so in the recent case of Reilly v Sandwell Metropolitan Borough Council which concerned an individual convicted of the surprisingly common offence of downloading indecent images of children.

Ms Reilly was the deputy head teacher of a primary school. She was in a close but not sexual relationship with a Mr Selwood and they did not live together. In 2003 they bought a property in joint names as an investment and Mr Selwood lived there, although he did not make any payments to Ms Reilly. Ms Reilly did not live there but she occasionally stayed overnight, including on 24 February 2009 when, the following morning, she awoke to the arrival of the police who searched the property and arrested Mr Selwood on suspicion of having downloaded indecent images of children. In September Ms Reilly was promoted to the post of head teacher at the school and in February 2010 Mr Selwood was convicted of making indecent images of children by downloading. On a scale of 1-5, the images ranged from level 1 to level 4. He was sentenced to a three year community order, made the subject of a sexual offences prevention order (which included a ban on him having unsupervised access to minors) and he was required to take part in a sex offenders’ programme.

Ms Reilly was immediately aware of the conviction and sentence but chose not to disclose them to the school governors or the local authority. In June 2010 the authority became aware of the conviction and she was suspended on full pay. She was required to attend a disciplinary hearing, the allegation being that, in failing to disclose her relationship with a man convicted of sexual offences concerning children, she had committed a serious breach of an implied term of her contract of employment, sufficient to warrant dismissal for gross misconduct. Following a hearing in May 2011 she was summarily dismissed. The panel was particularly concerned that Ms Reilly continued to refuse to accept that her continued association with Mr Selwood might pose a risk to children at the school. Her appeal against her dismissal failed.

Coming back for seconds: Waiter appeals dismissal for ‘rude, aggressive’ behaviour due to ‘being French’

As an Employment Solicitor, I deal with multiple discrimination claims. Personally, I find the majority of discrimination claims fascinating. Why? Because they are so varied and can be brought due to behaviour linked (in almost any way) to an individual’s gender, age, belief or religion, race, sexual orientation, disability, marriage or civil partnership, pregnancy or nationality.

As you’ll have no doubt spotted from the unusual title, it’s that last one, nationality, which I want to explore today.

Before we get into the legal angle, let’s quickly look at the facts. A waiter is reported to have taken action against a restaurant in Vancouver for his dismissal last year. His former employer stated that his dismissal was due to his “aggressive tone and nature” with colleagues further to previous verbal warnings as to his “combative and aggressive” behaviour towards fellow staff.

The waiter, Mr Guillaume Rey, has argued that his dismissal (and the reasoning behind it) is discriminatory because French culture “tends to be more direct and expressive”. Yes, that’s right, his core argument is that his confrontational behaviour should have been overlooked and/or condoned simply because he was French.

Dismissal for beard that was “too long” and “too religious” upheld

Back in December 2015 I commented on the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Ebrahimian v France, which concerned the termination of employment of a health worker at a hospital who refused (on religious grounds) to remove her headscarf when she was on duty at work. By way of a brief recap, state secularism (or laïcité) is a strongly protected principle in French society. That is why you will not hear hymns or carols sung in French schools and there was a big fuss last month when a village commune tried to place a nativity scene in the square in front of the local mairie. It was determined that Ms Ebrahimian, by wearing a symbol of religious affiliation, was breaching her duties as a public official. In its judgment the court held that the non-renewal of her employment contract did amount to an interference with her right to manifest her religion, contrary to Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights. However, that interference had the legitimate aim of protecting the rights and freedoms of others, pursuant to French law. Accordingly, her claim failed.

A similar case has now surfaced in the Versailles administrative Court of Appeal. A trainee doctor of Egyptian origin was dismissed from his job at Saint-Denis hospital centre in Seine-Saint-Denis because his “imposing” beard constituted an “ostentatious display of religious belief”. The individual concerned declined to deny or confirm that his appearance was intended to be a way to “demonstrate his religious activity”.  On 19 December, the Court of Appeal supported the decision, noting that although the wearing of a beard “even long”, cannot “on its own” cannot (necessarily) constitute a sign of religious affiliation, the “circumstances” entitled the hospital to at as it did.

The Santa Clause: Employment Law issues in Lapland

Penguin Santa You know who’s having a low media presence this year? Santa Claus! I mean, just look at the Christmas adverts this year! Without naming names, the ‘biggest’ Christmas adverts this year involve a monster, a carrot and a toy factory. The only ‘big’ advert that sees the big, red man is one in which Paddington bear mistakes a burglar for Santa!

So, why the low media presence? Where is Santa?

On that front, I may be able to help. You see, Mr Claus is currently having some Employment Law and HR issues with his workforce and has been busy obtaining legal advice on what to do next. It’s a stressful time of year, particularly with less and less people believing in him (there seems to be a rumour going around that he isn’t real) and certain big rival companies in the logistics business setting up in competition (the main one named after a geographical location considerably far away from Lapland).

Put simply, Christmas needs saving and Santa can’t operate without solving his current employment law issues. With this in mind, let’s go on a Christmas journey and help Santa save Christmas!

Can an employee be dismissed for supporting a certain sports team?

A few weeks ago, I went to the Belgium Grand Prix. Lewis Hamilton and Sebastian Vettel had a race-long battle which, for the most part, revealed a fairly even mix of Ferrari and Mercedes fans in the crowd. Hamilton won and was cheered onto the podium. At the next Grand Prix, in Italy, Hamilton won again. This time he was booed on the podium due to the vast number of Ferrari fans at the event. And, this last weekend, at the Singapore Grand Prix, the Ferrari cars were lambasted for crashing into each other and Hamilton took another (cheered) victory.

Why am I telling you this? Well, depending on which race you went to, your status as a Ferrari or Mercedes F1 fan would get a different reception and, weirdly, this can be the same with different workplaces.

Football is the obvious starting point here. If I worked in Manchester and declared myself to be a Liverpool FC fan on the first day by walking into the office with a Liverpool FC scarf, I’d be unlikely to make friendly quickly. In comparison, I’d most likely get a warmer reception if I did so in our Canter Levin & Berg office in the city centre (albeit there is a sizeable Everton-supporting community here too!)

But, surely, even if that is the case, the title of this blog is a daft question? In this age of publicised Employment Tribunal claims and employment law protection, surely an employer can’t take the ultimate act of dismissing someone just because they support a certain football team or Formula One team?

US firm starts microchipping employees – Science fiction or the future?

Microchip reader Yes, you read that correctly. Microchipping employees. And, no, that’s a real headline. A technology company in the USA has been widely reported as microchipping employees in place of their security and identity cards.

The first thing to get out of the way here is that they aren’t implanting an actual, square computer chip. Rather, they insert a tiny implant (the same size as a grain of rice) between an employee’s thumb and forefinger with a syringe. Apparently, removing it is akin to taking out a splinter (ouch?)

Now, apparently, the ‘younger generation’ are most likely to get onboard with this in the future. Well, I’m in my twenties and I’m not tempted in the slightest. Saying that, I hate needles, so that’s a poor starting point…

Looking at the wider picture, we live in a world of fingerprint ID on phones and being able to unlock the latest phone handsets with your own face. So why is an implant so controversial?

Does the recent European Court of Human Rights decision actually ban employee email monitoring?

You’ve probably seen the recent headlines: ‘Employer breached employee’s human right to privacy by reading workplace emails’, ‘Employers can’t place employee communications under surveillance due to human rights’, et cetera, et cetera. The thing is, broadly speaking and barring one key exception, those headlines are wrong.  Why?  Firstly, because the facts of the case were…